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Symposium on Buddhist Perspectives on Free

Will: Agentless Agency?
Rick Repetti 1

Abstract
This special issue of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Volume
25, is a symposium on the anthology, Buddhist Perspectives
on Free Will: Agentless Agency? (Repetti), and on the topic
reflected by that title, more broadly, based on an Author
Meets Critics session of the 2018 American Philosophical
Association Eastern Division meeting organized by Christian Coseru. To orient readers new to the topic, I first
sketch what some of the issues are regarding Buddhist
perspectives on free will. Second, I briefly describe the anthology, and third, I introduce the several contributions
to this symposium. As I am sympathetic to most of the papers here, I only respond briefly to them in this introduction, giving some reasons for my approval. Two papers
here, however, are significantly critical of either the anthology as a whole (Brent), or critical of my contributions
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to it (Meyers). I respond separately to each of them in the
last two papers in the symposium. Together with this introduction, all the included papers are original.

Precis
This special issue of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics is a symposium devoted
broadly to the subject of Buddhist perspectives on free will. The symposium grew out of what was originally to be an "Author Meets Critics"
panel on that topic, where I was the author, the critics were Marie
Friquegnon and Michael Brent, the chair (also session organizer) was
Christian Coseru, and the book was the edited collection, Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency? The panel was scheduled to be held
at the 2018 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) in Savannah, Georgia in January of this year. However,
due to inclement weather, the event was cancelled.
Daniel Cozort, general editor of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics (JBE),
was gracious enough to allow me to salvage most of the efforts that went
into preparing for that panel, originally organized and to be chaired by
Christian Coseru, by agreeing to publish the panel papers and allow me
to be the special issue editor. Whereas such conference panels are typically constrained by time to permit a few presenters, each with a limited
amount of time, followed by the author's response(s), this broader venue
enabled us to open up the discussion to longer papers, additional presenters, and to papers more broadly covering the topic of Buddhist perspectives on free will. The resulting several papers turned out to be
enough to constitute the equivalent of an edited collection.2
This Symposium could have as easily been published as a second volume to the edited
collection. However, in light of the generosity of support offered to me by this journal
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Thus, this special ]BE issue contains modified versions of those
three original panel papers written by Michael Brent, Karin Meyers, and
Marie Friquegnon, as well as four additional papers written by Katie Javanaud, Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas, Jonathan Gold, and James Luisi;
they either address particular articles, themes, or arguments from Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will, the collection as a whole, or just the topic of
possible Buddhist views on free will in general. My individual responses
to only two of those papers-one critical paper by Michael Brent, whose
manuscript targets most of the papers in the edited collection, and another by Karin Meyers, whose paper is directed primarily at my own
contributions to the edited collection-will follow those seven papers in
the symposium. My brief, approving responses to the other papers will
be included in this introduction to the symposium.
I encourage the authors of all the papers presented here, as well

as our readers, to submit short responses to these papers, using the
"Comments" feature on this website, which functions as an interactive
blog. Or, if anyone is so inclined, more substantive (article-length) responses may be submitted directly to the Journal of Buddhist Ethics for
consideration for formal publication.3
Before I sketch what each of the present papers is about, it would
be helpful to briefly discuss the edited collection that serves as the focal
point for most of them, and to say a few things about the issues that inthroughout my years of working with it, I thought it fitting to bring this work here,
where most of my publications on the subject were originally well-received and greatly
supported throughout the peer review and editorial processes. Another reason for publishing this collection here is the greater accessibility of the ]BE, as well as its interactive functionality as a blog, enabling reader commentary.
Two other scholars, Arindam chakrabarti and Daniel Breyer, each (separately) agreed
to submit papers to this collection, but they were unable to complete them on time.
Those papers might be published here separately, later.
3

640

Repetti, Symposium on Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will

form it. That is, what are the issues connected with the question of Buddhist perspectives on free will? By first sketching those, readers otherwise unfamiliar with this subject ought to be able to enter into it here.

What Do, or Can, Buddhists Think about Free Will?
That is the question, and it is more problematic than meets the eye.
There are many problems lurking beneath it, some less obvious than
others. I will only sketch some of these problems here, not only to bring
readers into the discussion, but also to demonstrate the complexity of
the free will problems (note the plural) in Buddhism, and to show how the
issue is just as complex, if not more complex, than the free will problem
in Western philosophy.

Can There Be Agency without an Agent-Self?
Today, most people in the West are minimally aware that Buddhism is
typically known to espouse the view that the self is something of an illusion, whatever that ultimately means. But it could mean different things,
and to different traditions and scholars within Buddhist philosophy, it
does mean different things. It could just mean that the self exists, for example, but not in the way it seems to exist. By analogy, there are sunrises and rainbows, but they do not exist in the way they seem to exist, at
least not in the way they seem for those uneducated about earth-spin
and the way clouds function to refract electromagnetic wavelengths
within the visible range. Rainbows are illusory, and so are sunrises; they
still exist, just not in the way ordinary perception presents them to our
understanding.
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In any case, upon reflection, if I consider this claim about the illusory nature of the self, in conjunction with the idea that the things that I
do are up to me, that is, that I act freely, or with free will, then the question immediately arises: How can my actions be mine, or genuinely up to
me if I-an alleged self-am subject to an illusion about whether or what I
am? That's the first and perhaps the foremost problem facing the question of whether there can be free will within Buddhism. Hence, the subtitle of the anthology under question: Agentless Agency? That is, how can
there be agency (free will) without an agent (a self), or self-rule (autonomy) with a self? For this reason, many Buddhist philosophers, scholars,
Dharma teachers,4 and followers of Buddhism simply reject the concept
of free will as an illusion: If there is no self, there can be no autonomous
self.
Others, however, disagree, as do I. To make a simple analogy:
suppose the no-self doctrine is correct, however that doctrine may be
understood (as sketched above, say, with sunrises and rainbows). Suppose, technically speaking, speaking is usually understood to require a
speaker. It would not necessarily follow from the no-self doctrine that
there is no speech. Instead, one could simply jettison the old idea that
speech requires a speaker, or alter one's understanding of what it means
to be a speaker, e.g., the person speaking. Intuitively, that makes more
sense than denying that there is speech. For to deny that there is speech
is to commit a performative contradiction: it requires speech to deny
that there is speech. There are many other ways to make out an intelligiUnlike, but somewhat similar to, the Hindu meaning of the term, "the Dharma" is the
Buddhist term for Buddhism, the truth as espoused by Buddhists, or the way or path of
Buddhism, among related meanings. Thus, Dharma teachers include Buddhas, other
enlightened beings, meditation masters, advanced meditation practitioners, and others
who espouse the Dharma, whether in sutras, sermons, lectures, or other formats. It is
believed that even hearing the Dharma is the result of, and brings, propitious circumstances or good karma.
4
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ble position to the effect that there may be agency without an agent, by
analogy. Whether any such ways of doing so are sound is the question.
The no-self doctrine poses, in my view, the main free will problem in Buddhism, but there are others. Let us review some of them.

Can There Be Karma and Rebirth without an Agent-Self?
Another problem has to do with the doctrines of karma and rebirth, and
is closely related to the question posed to the Buddha by the Brahmins
inquiring how it was possible for karma and reincarnation (Buddhists
prefer to refer to this as rebirth) to occur in the absence of a self or soul
whose karma it is and who is reborn. If there is no agent-self, so to speak,
how can there be karma and rebirth? Karma is technically intention, volition, and/ or volitional action, and free will may be described as autonomous choice, and/ or as autonomous action, both of which may be considered forms of volitional action. But if there is no agent, how can there
be choice, volition, action, and karma? Whose karma is it, and who is reborn? How can the term, which implies being born again, apply to what
appears to be two non-identical beings, since the term implies one being,
who was born before, being born again? If there is no identity between
them, there is no basis for the idea that birth has occurred again.
This question has been addressed, from the time of the Buddha
himself, although not emphasizing the agency side as much as the issue
of how there can be karma and rebirth without a self whose karma it is,
and who or what is reborn. But surely there is a link between the karma
issue and agency: karma is volition, and free will is a kind of volitional
freedom. Some understand karma to be iron-clad and thus unavoidable
or inevitable, rightly or wrongly, but it is easy to see how such a view of
karma could give rise to a free will question: If everything we experience
is the inevitable result of karma, beginningless karma, no less, how can

Journal ofBuddhist Ethics

643

there be free will? But if there is no free will, then why is anyone responsible for what they do, even karmically? Likewise, if everything is karmic, how is it that the Buddhist path can allegedly reverse the stream
and lead to liberation?
It is not emphasized enough, in my view, that the Buddha rejected several forms of fatalism or, as I prefer to lump them together, inevitabilisms: inevitable causation by gods, fate, matter, chance, and, most
notably, karma. Thus, the Buddha implicitly believed in some sort of
non-inevitabilism, or evitabilism, when it comes to volition.

Is Agency Inconsistent with Buddhist Causation?
Another free will problem within Buddhism concerns the broader Buddhist conception of causation. The Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, which holds, roughly, that whatever arises depends on causal
conditions, and is often thought to be functionally similar to (if not, for
some, identical with) the Western scientific/philosophical doctrine of
determinism, which holds, roughly, that whatever arises depends lawfully on causal conditions.
There are some significant differences in these doctrines, and
there are different versions of both, and thus Buddhist scholars and
Western philosophers disagree on the proper interpretation of each, but
there is enough resemblance between them to lead some contributors to
this discussion to conclude that, if Buddhist causation is deterministic,
then, just as in Western philosophy, this poses a challenge to belief in
free will: How can a choice be free if it is the lawfully necessary consequence of previous causal conditions?
A related question is: If everything is causally conditioned, then
how can enlightenment, which is described as unconditioned and cause-
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less, be brought about by that which is conditioned? One metaphorical
reply is to see enlightenment as our underlying Buddha nature, obscured
by ignorance, not brought about but revealed by removing the obscuration.

Is Free Will Possible in Light of the Buddha's Alleged Omniscience?
Yet another problem concerns the Buddha's alleged omniscience, which
is sometimes described as restricted to whatever the Buddha turns his
attentive gaze, such as the past and future lives of particular sentient
beings. This problem resembles the problem of divine foreknowledge in
Western theology: If an omniscient being (God, the Buddha, or anyone,
for that matter) impeccably foreknows that I will choose X in the future,
how could that choice be free? For the choice to be truly free, it seems
we must be able to bring about either of the two or more alternatives
that constitute the choice, but if only one outcome is already known by
an all-knowing being that cannot be falsified, then the other alternative
was never truly available. None of the contributors in this symposium
address this particular problem, although it is touched upon briefly in
the anthology (Harvey 163-165).

Can a Non-Agent Make the Choice and Efforts to Follow the Buddhist Path?
Another problem concerns the problematic idea of how anyone can
choose to follow the Buddhist path, or make the heroic efforts required
to traverse it, if no one has free will. Rather than make the sort of Olympic-training-level efforts that are prescribed in order to follow the Buddhist Eightfold Path, if there is no free will, what reason is there for anyone to try, when instead it would be easier to just sit back and wait to
become enlightened, since when that happens is not up to one. Even
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some of the Buddhist sages have seen and addressed this problem, which
is why it is addressed here in the symposium and in the anthology.

If There Are No Agent-Selves, How Can Buddhist Titans ofMind-Control Exist?
A more pressing problem concerns how Buddhism can account for the
titanic autonomy-like powers of its meditation adepts if there is no free
will, akin to imagining how someone can lift three hundred pounds but
cannot lift ten pounds. If making effort is hard to explain absent free
will, then explaining the successful cultivation of titanic skills after the
sustained exertion of Olympic athlete level efforts over decades, if not
lifetimes, is even more difficult. Self-mastery without a self: the very
verbal formulation outwardly displays its internal conflict. This issue is
addressed in detail in the anthology, and to a significant extent here.

Is There Free Will in Either of the Two Truths?
Another problem has to do with the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths,
one conventional or relative, the other ultimate or absolute. This doctrine is interpreted in different ways by earlier and later Buddhists. Simplifying greatly, early Buddhist foundationalist reductionists view momentary, psychophysical atomistic tropes as the ultimate reals, and everything else that is composite, partite, and constructed out of them, as
only conventionally real, since there are no wholes above and apart from
their parts. For them, the person is no more than a composite construction of all of its aggregated, momentary components, and so is its alleged
autonomy, but none of these are ultimately real. Also simplifying {greatly), later Buddhists reject even the foundationalist idea that the atomistic tropes are real, so for them everything is equally and only conventionally real. The only ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth.
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Alternately put, the idea is that everything is empty of essence, independent-being, or self-nature. Thus, for them, persons and free will are,
at best, only conventionally real, and there are disputes among later
Buddhist schools even about what things count as conventionally real.
In both early and later Buddhist views, however, conventional
reality is not ultimately real, so ultimately there is no free will. If so,
however, all the above problems become all the more pressing. Again,
there are divergent understandings of the two truths doctrine within
Buddhism, further complicating this question.

The Edited Collection, Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will
There are other problems with free will within Buddhism, but the above
sketch ought to suffice to provide the context for what follows. Let us
turn now to sketch the anthology that forms the focal point for this
symposium.
After having published a handful of my own articles on this topic
in this journal between 2010 and 2014, Daniel Cozort, general editor of
Journal ofBuddhist Ethics, suggested that I had enough material for a book.
Routledge agreed and published the edited collection Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency? in 2017, and then published my monograph on the same subject, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of
Mental Freedom, in 2018, the latter text of which contains a much more
comprehensive treatment of my own view of the subject, as well as a
critical review of all the other papers in the former text. There is only so
much that can be expressed in an article or chapter, and only so many
possible alternatives and potential objections that may be raised or responded to within such parameters. Thus, readers interested in a more
complete account of my own view of the subject are directed to the
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monograph, which unfortunately saw print only after the original APA
Author Meets Critics panel was scheduled to convene, and just around
the time the present papers were already mostly composed, in which
case many of the critical points raised in some of the present papers
were already forestalled, preempted, or otherwise foreclosed in the
monograph.5
The edited collection under review here, then, contains a substantive preface and introduction, and seventeen chapters in the following order, written by Christopher W. Gowans, me, Charles Goodman, Jay
Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Christian
Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, B. Alan Wallace, Martin T. Adam, Mark Siderits, Ben Abelson, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, Karin Meyers, and a final
chapter by me. A few of these were revised versions of earlier papers,
but the bulk were originally written for the collection. The sixteen authors altogether reflect a divergence of views among scholars and philosophers of Buddhism that parallels that of Western philosophers who
specialize in free will, and the collection of articles constitutes the bulk
of extant scholarship on the topic, with a few exceptions, including my
own recently published monograph, the first entirely devoted to the
question of Buddhism and free will. Likewise, the anthology was the first
collection of essays on Buddhism and free will.
Before the publication of the anthology, little had been written
explicitly on the topic of Buddhist perspectives on free will, at most
around a dozen or so articles, beginning in the latter half of the Twentieth century, some published in this journal (including one of my own,
plus my own four critiques of most of them). The anthology reflects the

Another "Author Meets Critics" session, this time devoted to the above-mentioned
monograph, will be held at the January 7-10, 2019 meeting of the APA Eastern Division
in New York City, both organized and to be chaired by Christian Coseru.

5
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lack of consensus in the Buddhist philosophical community about
whether the subject of free will is even a legitimate subject matter for
Buddhism, given the fairly widespread interpretation of the Buddhist
view of the self as illusory, the fairly divergent metaphysics to be found
in the different Buddhist traditions, and the different understandings of
agency thereof, among many other points of contention.
My own contributions to the edited collection were threefold.
First, as the editor, I tried (Preface; Introduction) to introduce the issues
connected with attempting a Buddhist position on free will to be raised
in the divergent contributions in a manner that revealed their philosophical complexity, some ways in which they do and/ or do not parallel
Western philosophical understanding, some ways in which these apparently orthogonal conceptual differences may be seen as problematizing
the basic concepts in the discussion, and noting general features of some
of the representatively divergent approaches and conceptions. Second, I
contributed one chapter (Why) defending the idea that there can and
ought to be a Buddhist theory of free will. This is contrary to the view
that Javanaud describes in her contribution here as Buddhist "skepticism" about free will (not to suggest that Javanaud is such a skeptic), reflected in varying degrees by contributors Blackmore, Flanagan, Garfield,
Goodman, Gowans, Strawson, and others, who suggest there can be no
free will in Buddhism because there is no self in Buddhism. Third, I contributed a chapter (Agentless) arguing for a particular theory of free will
that I think is available to Buddhists, based primarily on three things: (1)
the Buddha's own rejection of a variety of inevitabilist doctrines (inevitable causation by fate, gods, matter, chance, karma, etc.), (2) the sort of
mind-mastery attainable through Buddhist meditative practices, by
comparison with which the allegedly "strong" (perhaps the strongest)
Western philosophical conception of free will, namely, the libertarian's
"leeway" autonomy, the so-called ability to do otherwise under identical
conditions, and "source" autonomy, the ability to have it that one's
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choices and actions are up to oneself, appear facile, and (3) the fact that
an analysis of the meditation virtuoso's mental autonomy enables the
Buddhist free will theorist to challenge, if not defeat, all of the most
powerful Western analytic philosophical arguments against free will: the
Consequence Argument, the Manipulation Argument, the Randomness
Argument, the Luck Argument, and the Impossibility Argument.
It bears repeating, and also expounding on, that analysis of the
meditation virtuoso's skills reveals that the Buddhist conception of mental autonomy is significantly stronger and more robust than even the
strongest Western philosophical conception of free will, advocated by
various proponents of leeway and source autonomy. Wallace, McRae,
and Meyers make similar points about the titanic and supernormal, if
not supernatural, abilities of the meditation master or enlightened being, although they do not use this analysis to argue for the theory of free
will that I propose. Although I do argue for that theory in my latter
chapter in the edited collection, as I have elsewhere (Possibility; Freedom),
and in the monograph (Buddhism) I develop these arguments in much
greater detail, concluding that Western conceptions of strong free will
are relatively minor features of a much broader and more powerful form
of mental freedom, freedom of the mind, or mental autonomy, including not
only freedom of the will and freedom of action, along lines adumbrated originally by Harry Frankfurt, but also freedom of emotion (which McRae
makes clear in the edited collection), freedom of attention (which Federman and Ergas make clear in the present collection), freedom of thought
(which the Buddha himself made clear), and freedom of perception (which
Gold arguably makes clear in the present collection), among other forms
of freedom connected with any and all actually or potentially voluntary
behavior, with the latter qualifier referring to the sorts of supernormal
abilities of yogis to control otherwise uncontrolled autonomic nervous
system phenomena.
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Arguably, Buddhist mental freedom may also be thought to include freedom from the self, and/or freedom of the self. For, in deconstructing the self, deconditioning the ego-volitional complex that typically feeds the self, and revising our understanding of the dynamic mechanics of the self-appropriating process, we are able to free ourselves
from the unwholesome, mindless (ignorant) volitional complex (exemplified by the extremes of attraction and aversion, respectively, as greed
and hatred) identified as the primary source of our pathology. To keep in
line with the phraseology of being able to have the mental state, volitions, emotions, etc., that one wants as constituting forms of freedom
ranging over those phenomena, freedom of the self is the ability to have
the sort of self that one wants to have, namely, a dharmic or enlightened
one, understood pragmatically as functionally responsive to dharmic
reasons and conditions and understood metaphysically in insubstantial
terms, as opposed to a deluded, illusory sense of self as an immaterial
executive homunculus driving the mind-body and demanding that its
impulses be satisfied. 6
Having sketched the topic and the edited collection that serve as
the focus of this special issue, let me briefly describe each of the contributions to this symposium. They are presented in a loosely-related sequence, insofar as in some cases certain themes may be seen to justify
placing one after the other. Again, I will respond to only two of them in
my concluding contributions here.

6

I develop the idea of these freedoms of the mind (of volition, of emotion, of attention,

of perception, of the self, etc.) in "Freedom of the Mind: Buddhist Soft Compatibilism,"
presently a draft.
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Katie Javanaud
Katie Javanaud's contribution, "Tracing the Trajectory of Buddhist Free
Will Theorizing," raises the level of the discussion presented in Buddhist
Perspectives on Free Will by categorizing the papers and positions according to a useful set of distinctions. Thus, Javanaud distinguishes between
those who are sceptical of the project of presenting a Buddhist theory of
free will at all, and those who are not. She further distinguishes among
the latter, those who think Buddhism admits of an affirmative theory of
free will and those who think Buddhism admits of a negative theory. She
also calls attention to the need for deeper analysis, for example, on the
issue of the extent to which the Buddhist conception of dependent origination is homologous with or orthogonal to the Western (deterministic)
view of causation.
As we will see,Jonathan Gold,James Luisi, and Karin Meyers each
contribute different analyses of the Buddhist conception of causation
and/or dependent origination, implicitly answering Javanaud's call for
such clarification, albeit not in a way that forms any consensus. I argued
in my later contribution to the anthology (Agentless) that the specifics of
causation do not actually matter for purposes of the theory of free will
that I proposed, but I also address the issue here (Me) in my reply to
Meyers.

Michael Brent
In his "Confessions of a Deluded Westerner," Michael Brent arguably
pushes against Buddhism from the other side. Coming at this from a
more critical, Western analytic perspective, Brent critiques almost the
entire collection of papers in the anthology on the grounds that they fail
to identify what Western philosophers consider necessary and sufficient
conditions that are definitive or constitutive of the concept of free will.
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He argues that the various conceptions, abilities, or elements of agency
identified in the anthology not only do not constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy, but at most, they only constitute components or aspects of intentional action in general, not all of which are
free. He presents what he (implicitly) takes to be definitive of free will,
namely, what we may call (i) "leeway autonomy," the ability to have
done otherwise than what one did, and (ii) "source autonomy," the ability to have one's actions originate from oneself in such a way that they
are entirely up to oneself. Distinctive of these, on his analysis, is effort, on
which elsewhere (Agent) he bases his own agent-causal conception of intentional action, a conception he argues is independent of the question
of free will. Insofar as effort figures centrally in Brent's model of intentional action, it shares an emphasis with Jonathan Gold's analysis, as we
shall see below.
Brent's core idea (in Confessions) seems to be that the agent is the
cause of free action, just as the agent is the cause of intentional action,
but those free intentional actions are only those that exhibit leeway
and/ or source autonomy. He argues, more importantly, that because
Buddhism rejects the reality of the self, i.e., the agent, there can be no
intentional action whatsoever, and thus no species of it, such that any
intentional actions are free.
This is not a novel view, and as noted above, a handful of the contributors to the edited collection argued there can be no free will if there
is no self. Brent is aware of this, so his critique may be considered to target those other views, like mine, Harvey's, and Wallace's, etc., that constitute the majority of views in the anthology, which allow that there
can be free will even if there is no metaphysically substantive self, but
only a conventional, empirical one. I will respond to some of Brent's criticisms in my separate reply (Us) to his contribution to this collection, so I
will defer any further remarks for now.
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Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas
Although Asaf Federman and Oren Ergas did not contribute to the anthology, they may be counted among the majority of compatibilist views
reflected there. In ''The Healing Paradox of Controlled Behavior: A Perspective from Mindfulness-Based Interventions," Federman and Ergas
raise the level of the discussion as they analyze in detail some of the progressive stages undergone by practitioners of Buddhism-based, but secular, mindfulness-based meditation practices and related therapeutic interventions. They present an analysis of the process that involves what
they describe as a paradox of control, my analysis of which suggests that
their model counts as a counterexample to Brent's claim that there cannot be agentless agency.
They note, at an early stage in the meditative process, concentration is developed through practice, and involves a direct form of mental
control over attention. However, at a later stage of practice, one develops a kind of non-control or "choiceless awareness" that nevertheless
indirectly enables an increase in the ability to control how one responds
to the contents of consciousness. Their insightful contribution resembles
the sort of Buddhist-meditation-based analysis of free will that I presented in this journal in 2010 (Theory), and which I presented again, but
in much greater detail, in my just-published monograph (Buddhism).
Their detailed analysis of how mindfulness-based interventions
help individuals overcome psychopathologies and gain heightened degrees of self-regulative abilities not only fits well with my suggestions
for a Buddhist theory of free will, but displays the extent to which secular mindfulness practices satisfy the dharmic imperative of reducing suffering and engendering growth in insight. These benefits of their analysis, on my reading, also count as counterexamples to the ever-increasing
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blowback against secular mindfulness, first popularized by David Loy and
Ron Purser in their coining of the term "McMindfulness."7

Jonathan Gold
Jonathan Gold's contribution, "Freedom through Cumulative Moral Cultivation: Heroic Willpower (Vīrya)," also raises the level of the discussion,
insofar as he offers a very close analysis of the chain of dependent origination, beginning with the ordinary person's hearing the teachings of
the Dharma and culminating with the attainment of total mental freedom
or enlightenment. In that analysis, Gold emphasizes the crucial role of
effort, which implicitly suggests some sort of free will. (Recall that Brent,
an advocate of libertarian criteria for free will, places effort at the core
of his analysis of intentional action.)
However, although Gold delineates the causal sequence of dependent origination (that guides the practitioner to total freedom) within an intuitively explanatory narrative analysis, the explanatory sequence of the transformative progressions detailed in his account gives
the implicit impression that the sequence is otherwise (mostly) deterministic, although he does not explicitly emphasize determinism.
By paying such close attention to the movement between the
links in the chain of dependent origination, Gold's paper furthers the
interests of Javanaud's suggestion regarding a clarification of the nature
of Buddhist causation, on the one hand, but does not exactly answer the
question explicitly, on the other hand, insofar as his analysis focuses on
the sort of causation that figures in the path, but it does not focus on the

For a collection of such criticisms, see Purser, Forbes, and Burke, eds., whose collection includes my own counter-critique in defense of secular mindfulness (Matters).
7
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nature of causation in general. And insofar as Gold emphasizes the role
of effort, he also furthers the discussion put forth by Brent. It is an interesting question how the two views may be combined, if at all.
Again, like Brent, Gold presses the issue of effort as centrally relevant to the question of free will, insofar as he is implicitly associating
effort with agency, but, like Federman and Ergas, he does so in a nuanced, almost paradoxical way. Gold details the dependently originating
progression from the worldling's hearing of the Dharma to the final
phase of the contemplative virtuoso attaining enlightenment, in a way
that I think is consistent with my own analysis, but one that I imagine
hard determinists (incompatibilists who accept determinism and thus
reject free will) could conceivably adopt to support their rejection of free
will. Arguably, Gold's analysis does not seem to rely on anything that the
free will advocate seems to require. In all, Gold raises the level of the discussion, and his analysis raises many interesting questions.

James Luisi
James Luisi's contribution, "Buddhist Philosophy, Free Will, and Artificial
Intelligence," delivers a novel perspective from his work on artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing (QC), and related scientific fields to
bear on the possible positions on free will open to Buddhist philosophy.
Luisi argues that the sort of causality involved in AI and QC is neither
strictly rigidly deterministic, nor strictly chaotically indeterministic, but
a (middle way) combination of both that circumvents the traditional
Western philosophical binary dichotomy of either (i) determinism (thus
no alternatives, and thus no free will), versus (ii) indeterminism (thus
randomness, thus nothing is up to me, and thus no free will), rendering
the alleged dichotomy either false or superfluous. In this regard, his
analysis furthers the discussion of the nature of causation called for by
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Javanaud, although more directly or immediately on the Western scientific side, but with implications that Luisi applies to the Buddhist side.
Thus, Luisi argues that his analysis supports what I originally described
as wiggly determinism, but what I have subsequently revised to describe as
wiggly causation,8 a conception consistent with Buddhism and which
makes room for free will.
However, as I am only minimally familiar with AI, QC, and the
like, I cannot speak with confidence to the elements ofLuisi's arguments
that rest directly on those ideas. But I can say that if his account of such
matters is accurate, then his arguments ought to prove interesting to
anyone taken in by the Western philosophical binary of determinism
versus indeterminism. An additionally interesting component of Luisi's
contribution is his inclusion of a few brief, ironic exchanges between
speaking neurons, introducing a refreshing element of humor that he has
employed fruitfully in his books on AI (Sensitive) and enterprise architecture (Pragmatic).

In a paper (Repetti Earlier) critiquing the views of some earlier contemporary period
Buddhist scholars, such as Francis Story, David Kalupahana, Rahula Walpola, and Luis
Gomez, I described their attempts to get around the determinism/indeterminism binary and dichotomy as wiggly determinism because, I argued, they had to accept one or the
other, for one iota of indeterminism renders a world indeterministic, in which case
there either is or is not an element of indeterminism in a world. If there is, it is an indeterministic world; if not, it is a deterministic world. Those writers claimed Buddhist
causation is neither rigidly deterministic, not chaotically random, but they seemed to
favor determinism over indeterminism, based on dependent origination; hence, my
somewhat critical description, wiggly determinism, which, I argued, was probably
equivalent to soft determinism, the view that determinism is true but not inevitabilist.
After discussing the issue with Luisi (Personal), however, I realized it makes sense to
think a world can be partly deterministic and partly indeterministic; hence, my new,
not-critical description, wiggly causation.
8
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Karin Meyers

Karin Meyers's contribution, "False Friends: Dependent Origination and
the Perils of Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," may be described as
offering two major components, one positive and one negative, the latter
breaks into three subcomponents. Her positive contribution is an astute
analysis of the history of the concept of dependent origination throughout the development of (mostly Early) Buddhism over the centuries, and
a fairly thorough answer to Javanaud's call for further clarification
thereof, similar to Gold's analysis regarding what is narrowly relevant to
the path. Meyers's analysis of dependent origination may be seen as the
basis for part of her negative contribution, which latter may be divided
in three parts: (i) a critique of the idea that dependent origination may
be identified-or even reasonably compared-with the Western conception of deterministic causation; (ii) a critique of various of my own ideas
in Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will; and (iii) a critique of some of the other
ideas in that collection. The first two critiques seem to take up the bulk
of her analysis.
To put Meyers's contributions in a positive light, I take it that
what motivates her three critiques, and her positive analysis of dependent origination that her critique in (i) above rests upon, is a noble desire
to protect the textual core of canonical Buddhism in its original meaning
to non-Western Buddhists, against some of the less textually-based,
more liberal, Western philosophical interpretations and/ or applications
of Buddhist ideas as they may be found reflected in the work of some of
the contributors to the edited collection, including, if not particularly,
my own work. Philosophical criticism may be understood as a form of
flattery, insofar as it at least dignifies the ideas being critiqued as worthy
of engagement, assessment, and (theoretically) open to revision. To her
credit, Meyers attempts to dignify my ideas in these ways, and she also
points out many ways in which we arrive at similar conclusions, in which
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my own contributions to the collection have raised the level of the discussion, as well as ways in which the collection as a whole constitutes a
valuable contribution to the literature, among other compliments. I attempt to dignify her ideas equally when I respond to her many critical
claims in my concluding contribution here (Me). I will postpone any further remarks about her contribution until then.

Marie Friquegnon
Marie Friquegnon expands on the presentation she gave in her original
contribution to Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (Repetti), which introduced three ways of understanding the concept of freedom in Buddhism,
and applies that understanding to some of the other contributions in
that collection. In "A Role for Primordial Wisdom in the Buddhist Free
Will Controversy," Friquegnon goes on to analyze Śāntideva's teaching
about the bodhisattva who, employing (the doctrine of) skillful means,9
kills a pirate to prevent the pirate from murdering 500 men on a ship,
who themselves happened to be advanced along the bodhisattva path, in
order to spare the pirate from the terrible karma he would otherwise
incur. 10
This doctrine may be understood as resembling act utilitarianism, the ethical view that
the morally best action is whichever action, under the unique circumstances, brings
about the greatest overall positive consequences for the greater number of sentient
beings affected by the action, among the set of possible alternative actions, all things
considered. In the case of skillful means, this doctrine may be seen as a wild card that
only spiritually advanced Buddhists may use to break the otherwise standard ethical
rules that ordinarily govern the behavior of Buddhists, if and only if the advanced Buddhist is bypassing the rule specifically to the benefit of others who would predictably
suffer if the advanced Buddhist did not deploy skillful means to such better ends.
9

According to Buddhist lore, harming anyone or anything connected with the Dharma,
such as a Buddha, arhat (enlightened being), or bodhisattva, magnifies one's negative

10
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To explain and resolve problems with these sorts of cases,
Friquegnon introduces the idea that primordial wisdom may be understood as a hypothetical construct, a notion she explains in a way that renders it, to my thinking, similar to the idea of a theoretical posit, and she
makes an analogy between the Buddhist idea of the divine (implicitly
reflected in the facially-problematic goodness of the murdering bodhisattva) with what she takes to be Aquinas's use of similar reasoning,
about how a being beyond human comprehension, namely, God, could
have human-like qualities, such as benevolence. Friquegnon claims,
similarly, that the advanced meditator experiences something analogous
(to the inherent goodness of primordial wisdom) in nondual states of
meditation: although the experience is nondual, somewhat paradoxically, the practitioner senses inherent goodness. Ultimately, she treats the
freedom that consists of enlightenment, which she sees reflected in primordial wisdom, as central to the highest Buddhist understanding of
freedom.

Conclusion
Together, these papers significantly advance the discussion reflected in
Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will, and each raises the level of the discussion, some in similar ways, others in different ways. Again, this JBE symposium may be seen to function as a second volume to the original col-

karma exponentially. Thus, the amount of bad karma this pirate would accrue by murdering 500 bodhisattvas is immense. In this example, killing the pirate in order to spare
him this terrible misfortune is considered merciful. It also resembles utilitarian (consequentialist) arguments in favor of murdering young Adolph Hitler, torturing terrorists
bent on mass destruction, and the like. For a sustained, interesting argument along
such lines to the conclusion that Buddhist ethics is a form of negative consequentialism, see Goodman (Consequences).
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lection of seventeen papers. I leave it up to the reader to assess the relative merits of each contribution here. I also reiterate my suggestion to
participate in the discussion by supplying short comments to the blog
using the Comment feature, or longer responses as articles to be submitted to the Journal ofBuddhist Ethics.
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